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ABSTRACT
In Fairness versus Welfare, we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed based
entirely on their effects on individuals’ well-being.  This thesis implies that no independent weight
should be accorded to notions of fairness (other than many purely distributive notions).  We support
our thesis in three ways: by demonstrating how notions of fairness perversely reduce welfare,
indeed, sometimes everyone’s well-being; by revealing numerous other deficiencies in the notions,
including their lack of sound rationales; and by providing an account of notions of fairness that
explains their intuitive appeal in a manner that reinforces the conclusion that they should not be
treated as independent principles in policy assessment.  In this essay, we discuss these three themes
and comment on issues raised by Richard Craswell, Lewis Kornhauser, and Jeremy Waldron.
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In Fairness versus Welfare, we advance the thesis that social policies, notably, legal
rules, should be selected entirely with regard to their effects on the well-being of individuals. 
Accordingly, notions of fairness, such as corrective and retributive justice, should receive no
independent weight in policy assessment.  Our argument is based on the perverse effects on
welfare of pursuing notions of fairness, other problematic aspects of the notions, notably, their
lack of rationale, and a reconciliation of our thesis with the existence of moral intuitions that
seem to favor the notions.  Each of these themes is developed in general terms and in detailed
analyses of leading notions of fairness in the areas of torts, contracts, legal procedure, and law
enforcement.
In this symposium, Richard Craswell questions our demonstration that endorsement of
any notion of fairness sometimes reduces every individual’s well-being (that is, violates the
Pareto principle).  Jeremy Waldron, while commending our incorporation of distributive
concerns in the concept of welfare that we defend, voices some disagreement with our treatment
of the subject of distributive justice.  And Lewis Kornhauser presents arguments concerning our
inclusive definition of well-being.
In section I, we review the terminology and the main themes of our book.  Then, in
sections II-IV, we address the main points of Craswell, Waldron, and Kornhauser, explaining
that none of their claims pose significant challenges to our thesis even if they are valid and also
that their arguments reflect misinterpretations of our views or are otherwise mistaken.  In section
V, we offer concluding remarks.
I.  FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
In this section, we begin by defining what we mean by welfare and notions of fairness
because these terms are central to understanding our thesis that policy assessment should be
based only on welfare, with no independent weight given to notions of fairness.  Then we
summarize the three central claims that we offer in support of our thesis.
A.  Welfare and Fairness
Welfare.
1 — Under a welfarist approach to policy assessment, one first determines how a
policy affects each individual’s well-being and then makes an aggregate (distributive) judgment
based exclusively on this information pertaining to individuals’ welfare.
The conception of individuals’ well-being that we consider, in the tradition of welfare
economics, is a comprehensive one.  It encompasses not only the direct benefits that individuals
obtain from the consumption of goods and services, but also individuals’ degrees of aesthetic
fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they value.  What factors are included
in well-being — and with what weight — is understood subjectively, in terms of what actually
matters to individuals.  An implication of our broad definition is that even tastes for fairness are2For discussions of issues concerning possible differences between individuals’
preferences and their actual well-being as well as of matters involving possible changes in
preferences, objectionable preferences, and tastes for fairness, see FVW, VIII.B.
3See FVW, II.B.
4For a formal statement of the difference between welfare and fairness, as we define the
terms, see FVW, pp. 24 n.15, 39 n.52, and Kaplow and Shavell (2001, p. 283).
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included: Just as an individual might derive pleasure from art, nature, or fine wine, so might an
individual feel better from the knowledge, for example, that vicious criminals receive their just
deserts.  This view, under which tastes for fairness are counted with a weight to be determined
empirically, based on the actual weight, if any, that individuals place on such tastes, must be
sharply distinguished from the view of notions of fairness as independent evaluative principles,
the subject of our critique.
2
Given this definition of well-being, our advocating that policy assessment be based
exclusively on welfare is equivalent to embracing the moral position that policy choice should
depend solely on concerns for human welfare.  Furthermore, this characterization of our thesis
suggests why we choose the inclusive definition of well-being that we do.  Ultimately, the moral
force of welfarism is grounded in what matters to individuals, and what really matters to
individuals is not to be determined based on an analyst’s personal judgment, however derived, of
what others should or should not value.  Nevertheless, little of our analysis depends on this
specification of individuals’ well-being; as we emphasize in our book, if one favors a different
view of well-being, our main arguments imply that policy assessments should be made solely
with regard to how policies affect well-being thus construed, with no independent weight given
to notions of fairness.  (See, e.g., FVW, pp. 23-24 & n. 14, 409.)
As we noted at the outset, welfare-based policy assessments also require a distributive
judgment.  We offer a number of remarks on the subject in our book, the most important being
that our thesis is independent of how such judgments should be made.  (See, e.g., FVW, II.A.2,
II.A.3, III.C.2.e, IV.D.1, VIII.C.)  The reason is that our thesis is addressed to a prior question,
whether policy assessments (including distributive judgments) should be based exclusively on
individuals’ well-being or also (or instead) on factors that are independent of individuals’ well-
being.
Fairness.
3 — By notions of fairness we include all principles — whether stated in terms
of justice (such as corrective or retributive justice), rights (such as a right to a day in court), or
cognate concepts (such as the sanctity of promises) — that may be employed to assess the
desirability of policy and that have the following characteristic: At least some weight is given to
factors independent of individuals’ well-being.  That is, we define notions of fairness to include
all independent evaluative principles that are not purely welfarist.
4
Our purpose in adopting this definition is one of convenience.  Each of our three main
themes, as well as the particular arguments relating to them, distinguishes between approaches
that are based solely on individuals’ well-being and those that are not.  Hence, we find it useful
to employ a single, familiar term (one that seems to have no precise, canonical meaning) to refer- 3 -
to all principles that are, in some respect, other than welfarist.
Four points deserve emphasis.  First, most notions of fairness are nonconsequentialist:
Characteristically, one examines particular features of situations to determine what outcome is
most fitting according to a given principle of fairness.  For example, if A wrongfully injured B,
then B should be compensated by A; if A’s action toward B would break a promise, then it is
impermissible; if the true nature of the crime was X, then the punishment should be P(X).  In
particular, whether A should compensate B, A may break a promise, or the punishment should be
P(X) does not depend exclusively (or at all) on an assessment of the consequences of doing these
things, such as the deterrence of undesirable behavior.
Second, most fairness proponents, including most modern policy analysts who grant
importance to notions of fairness, hold mixed normative views, under which some weight is
accorded to conceptions of fairness and some to welfare.  (At a minimum, most who endorse
various nonconsequentialist fairness principles would not adhere to them if the adverse
consequences would be extreme.)  Our definition of fairness includes such mixed views, and our
objections apply to them to the extent that weight is given to considerations other than welfare.
Third, sometimes notions of fairness may be invoked without meaning to contradict a
purely welfarist view:  A notion of fairness (perhaps a purely distributive notion) might refer
exclusively to effects on individuals’ well-being, and some notions of fairness may be used as
proxy criteria when the concern really is welfarist (requiring that wrongdoers pay for harm could
be favored solely on deterrence grounds).  We have no per se objection to use of notions of
fairness as stand-ins for welfare since our concern is not semantic (although as a practical matter
it is often best for policy analysis to address our actual objectives directly and explicitly).  We
observe, however, that all of the leading notions of fairness that we analyze in our book are
generally offered not as proxy criteria for welfare but rather as independent principles of
evaluation.
Fourth, although we object to the use of notions of fairness as independent evaluative
principles, we do not necessarily object to arguments for one or another normative principle that
happen to be couched in the language of fairness.  Accordingly, our analysis makes no claim
about whether an argument that may sound in fairness (or justice or related terms) is thereby
untenable.  Rather, our claim is that the ultimate criterion for policy assessment should be one
that is based exclusively on welfare.  To be sure, claims that one or another outcome is unfair
often are unhelpful because they convey little information beyond the fact of the author’s
condemnation.  Nevertheless, the object of our book is to show that arguments, however
articulated, favoring policy assessment based on fairness principles are deficient, whereas
arguments favoring welfare-based assessment are compelling, whether or not phrased as such.
B.  Conflict between Fairness and Welfare
The first major theme of our book is that pursuit of notions of fairness results in a
needless and, at root, perverse, reduction in individuals’ well-being.  That advancing notions of
fairness reduces well-being is, as we clearly state in our book (FVW, p. 7), a tautology on a
general level:  Because we define fairness principles as those that accord weight to factors5We refer to the weak Pareto principle, which holds that if everyone is strictly better off
under one policy than under another, the former should be deemed superior.
6We are ignoring the uninteresting case in which welfare is identical under the two
regimes.
7We first published the symmetric case result in Kaplow and Shavell (1999).  In FVW,
the symmetric-case argument appears in general terms in II.C.1, in the tort setting in III.C.1.e, in
the procedure setting in V.A.5 and V.B.3-V.B.4, and at various other points.  We use other
demonstrations as well, such as in the contract setting in IV.C.1.f and IV.C.2.e.  Our general,
formal proof appears in Kaplow and Shavell (2001).  For further discussion, see FVW, II.C.1
(especially the notes), and Kaplow and Shavell (2000).
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independent of well-being, whenever fairness and welfare assessments differ, it must be that
advancing fairness reduces overall well-being.
We nevertheless emphasize this basic conflict for two reasons.  First, the depth of the
tension between fairness and welfare is not widely appreciated; indeed, in policy analysis that
rests on notions of fairness, it usually is not even mentioned.  Second, by examining in detail a
variety of concrete, paradigmatic settings that lie at the core of the domain of fairness principles,
the true nature of the conflict is revealed.  One is able to see what it is about leading notions of
fairness that makes individuals worse off, and one is thereby better able to assess (see also
section C) what, if anything, may be said to justify sacrificing human well-being.
Reinforcing the second point is that, in each of the situations that we examine, we present
the striking argument that promoting any of the pertinent notions of fairness sometimes makes
literally everyone worse off, that is, violates the Pareto principle.
5  One way of demonstrating
this argument focuses on symmetric cases.  For example, in the tort setting, suppose that each
individual is equally often an injurer and a victim (and is identical in all other respects, such that
the harm that might be caused, the cost of precaution, and so forth are the same for everyone). 
Further, suppose that there arises a situation in which a favored notion of fairness conflicts with
welfare.  For instance, a notion of corrective justice might be held to favor the negligence rule
(because the notion holds that wrongdoers, and only wrongdoers, should pay) even though a rule
of strict liability results in higher welfare (say, because it better controls injurers’ activity levels).
Now it should be clear that, in a symmetric case, advancing any notion of fairness will
always make everyone worse off when it conflicts with welfare.  After all, in a symmetric case,
everyone is identically affected, so in comparing two regimes, everyone must be better off under
one regime than under the other.
6  A welfare-based analysis, of course, favors the regime under
which everyone is better off.  Hence, if a notion of fairness conflicts with welfare, it must be that
it favors the regime in which every individual’s well-being is lower.
This generic symmetric-case demonstration is supplemented by concrete examples and
by other demonstrations of the Pareto conflict, some specific to particular contexts and one
formal, technical proof that is quite general.
7  Even though as a practical matter it will rarely if
ever be the case that one of two policies under serious consideration will literally make everyone
better off than the other — a point we have emphasized from the outset of our work on the- 5 -
question (Kaplow and Shavell 1999, pp. 72-74; 2001, pp. 284-85; FVW, pp. 55-58 & n. 78) —
the result that all notions of fairness sometimes make everyone worse off is of great significance
regarding the soundness of these notions as policymaking criteria.  This is true for a number of
reasons.
First, even most proponents of notions of fairness will find it deeply troubling that
adherence to their principles entails endorsing the principle that sometimes it should be deemed
socially desirable to make everyone worse off.  Indeed, one can ask to whom one is being fair if
every individual is made worse off.  Furthermore, proponents of notions of fairness who ground
the notions in ideas of freedom and autonomy should have particular difficulty with our
demonstration since individuals would unanimously reject a fairness notion if it makes them all
worse off.
Second, there is an important matter of logical consistency.  If indeed a principle is
shown to be deficient, one cannot consistently adhere to it on the ground that the case in which
its deficiency is glaringly apparent is not the case one is considering at the moment.  This point
about logical consistency, which is a staple of argument in moral philosophy, has all the more
force because the cases in which we demonstrate the Pareto conflict in our book — often
symmetric cases — are simple, basic, paradigmatic, clear cases in which notions of fairness
apply.  Our judgments about such cases should carry more weight, decisive weight, compared to
our judgments in cases with many potentially conflating factors, in which it is difficult to reach
conclusions with confidence.
Third, as we elaborate in our book and elsewhere, our demonstration that all notions of
fairness always make everyone worse off in the symmetric case is especially significant under
many broadly endorsed normative frameworks.  (See, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell 1999, pp. 73-74;
FVW, II.C.1, III.C.1.e.iii.)  We show that the Golden Rule, Kant’s categorical imperative, and
the veil-of-ignorance construct each require that normative principles be tested as if one is in a
symmetric setting.  (The reason, in brief, has to do with the need for impartiality: One could, for
example, favor “might makes right” as a general rule if one was unusually mighty, but if one is
forced to assume that just as often someone else will be mightier, one would reject such a rule.) 
Accordingly, if one adheres to any or all of these normative frameworks — as most fairness
proponents in fact do — one is forced either to reject all nonwelfarist principles or to endorse the
view that making everyone worse off should be the core feature of any sound normative
principle.
Although we regard the conflict between notions of fairness and the Pareto principle as
powerful, we also should emphasize that much of our book’s analysis of the broader conflict
between fairness and welfare does not focus on this particular argument.  The second part of our
book — chapters III-VI, constituting nearly two-thirds of the total — examines how fairness
reduces welfare in detail and often without regard to the Pareto principle.  For example, chapter
III on torts fully considers nonreciprocal cases in which Pareto conflicts do not typically occur,
and chapter VI on law enforcement and retributive justice, the longest chapter in our book,
makes almost no reference to the Pareto principle in arguing that notions of fairness are perverse
with regard to their implications for individuals’ well-being (for example, the only beneficiaries
of a more fair system may be criminals who escape punishment and thus profit from their8For a summary of many of our points, see FVW, II.B.2, II.C.2.  Fuller statements appear
throughout chapters III-VI.
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crimes).  That is, we rely not only on an abstract, if extremely important, general argument, but
also on particular analysis of how leading notions of fairness play out in important legal settings.
C.  Further Deficiencies in Notions of Fairness
8
Our second central theme in Fairness versus Welfare concerns largely internal
deficiencies in notions of fairness themselves.  Perhaps the most important is their lack of
rationale.  We develop this theme by considering in great detail justifications that have been
offered both by moral philosophers and by legal scholars.  In addition, with regard to the
scenarios in each of the legal contexts that we examine in depth, we further consider what
warrant might be offered for giving weight to notions of fairness.  We consistently find that none
of the possible rationales is convincing.
For example, upon reviewing the literature supporting retributive justice, from Aristotle
to Kant and Hegel to moderns, it is difficult to identify the affirmative case for the principle. 
Instead, one finds, for example, reference to the need to restore some sort of moral balance in the
world, more a conclusory metaphor than anything else.  When one adds that even retributivists
would not punish all wrongs (most lies, for example) and that, more broadly, different theories
with different metaphors are applied in different contexts (even though, on their face, many of
the theories and metaphors apply to the other contexts as well), it becomes difficult to imagine
how plausible justifications could be offered for these theories.
We also identify a number of difficulties that, although not necessarily inherent in
notions of fairness, seem to be endemic.  There are matters of definition, often so serious as to
leave basic statements of fairness notions highly incomplete if not entirely empty.  Corrective
justice purports to answer questions of tort law by holding that wrongdoers should compensate
victims, but then a theory of wrongdoing must be supplied and it is that theory that ultimately
indicates who should compensate whom.  Likewise for promise-keeping (because promises must
be interpreted) and for retributive justice (because the wrongfulness of acts that vary on many
dimensions must be measured in a common denominator and equated, in some often unspecified
proportion, to measures of punishment).  We further observe that such fundamental problems in
stating and applying the principles is probably related to their lack of affirmative rationale; it is
difficult to imagine that, if there were readily identifiable reasons for pursuing the principles, we
would have so little idea of what they mean.
In addition, many notions of fairness involve adopting an ex post perspective, asking, for
example, what punishment is appropriate given that a crime has been committed and the criminal
apprehended and convicted.  This perspective tends to undervalue or ignore other outcomes,
including more likely ones, such as the fact that for many crimes most criminals go scot-free. 
Relatedly, behavioral effects, such as whether crimes are committed, are downplayed if even
considered at all.  Principles that require incomplete assessments of situations are unlikely to
lead to sound policy choices.  (One of our subthemes is that notions of fairness often serve as9See FVW, II.D, for explanation of the argument in general terms, III.E, IV.C.2.g, V.A.6,
V.B.3.f, and VI.D for development of the argument in each of the legal contexts that we
examine, and these sections as well as II.B.2.c and VII.B.1 for additional explanations for the
appeal of fairness principles that are consistent with our thesis.
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proxy indicators of welfare, which in turn helps to explain their appeal.  Indeed, in our analysis
of leading fairness principles, we often find that, with regard to aspects of situations that the
principles do lead one to consider, they often point toward welfare-relevant effects; moreover,
when the principles conflict with welfare, it is often precisely on account of the welfare-relevant
factors that the principles lead the analyst to ignore.)
Yet another problem arises from the nonconsequentialist nature of most notions of
fairness.  A common repercussion is that a rule can be deemed more fair even though it results in
more unfair outcomes or a greater incidence of the behavior whose wrongfulness underlies the
motivation for the theory.  For example, we show how insisting on the fair punishment for, say,
murder, can result in more actual instances of unfair punishment of murderers and in a greater
number of innocent people mistakenly accused of murder, and also in more murder, which
retributive theory deems to be a serious wrong such as to demand punishment in the first
instance.
These points — especially that concerning the lack of affirmative rationale for notions of
fairness — are difficult to capture well in this recapitulation.  Their development occupies much
of our book and a disproportionate share of the extensive notes and references.  The extent of
these deficiencies is notable in view of the centuries of attention given to the notions of fairness
by scholars, the vast majority of whom are proponents of the notions.  In summary, notions of
fairness are quite difficult to defend even aside from the adverse, often perverse, implications of
pursuing notions of fairness for human welfare.
D.  Social Norms and the Reconciliation of Fairness’s Appeal with Welfarism
The third major theme of our book involves providing an answer to the question of how it
can be that notions of fairness appeal to our moral instincts and intuitions and yet should not be
given any independent weight in policy assessment.  An important part of our answer, which is
social scientific in nature, involves social norms.
9
First, we observe that principles of fairness tend to correspond to internalized social
norms, such as keeping promises and holding wrongdoers accountable.  These social norms are
commands that people want to obey because the maxims have been inculcated or are inborn. 
Thus, one might feel guilty for telling a lie (and also may fear social disapprobation).  Social
norms appeal to us both because of their internalization and related social reinforcement and
because they valuably guide our behavior and curb opportunism in everyday life.  Given their
internalized character and instrumental value, it is not surprising that individuals who engage in
policy analysis, themselves well-socialized members of society who attach importance to these10This explanation also indicates why individuals may have a taste for notions of fairness
in the sense discussed in section I.A.
11Relatedly, this relationship between functional social norms and notions of fairness
explains why notions of fairness tend to have the aforementioned proxy characteristic that they
tend to indicate some respects in which policies promote welfare (but they also tend to be
incomplete and sometimes misleading in large part because important context differences render
fairness principles imperfect proxies).
12As should be clear from the text and as we emphasize in the book, this argument
demonstrates that policy analysts should not be guided by notions of fairness but in no way
indicates that individuals in everyday life should cast aside social norms.  See chapter VII of
FVW for discussion of the differing implications of our analysis for ordinary individuals, policy
analysts, and government decisionmakers.
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social norms, will be inclined to accord weight to corresponding notions of fairness.
10  For
example, our attachment to the social norm that promises should be kept naturally disposes us to
favor the promise-keeping notion of fairness when we assess contract law.
Second, we examine the implications of this phenomenon.  Most important, it provides
an explanation for the attraction of notions of fairness, but an explanation that offers no
justification for according the notions independent evaluative weight.  That individuals are in a
sense programmed to conduct their everyday lives in accordance with social norms does not
warrant elevating these norms to the status of independent evaluative principles in the
qualitatively different context of legal policy design.  Moreover, given that the raison d’être of
social norms is functional, to promote welfare, it would be an ironic mistake for the analyst to
treat them as if they were independent principles to be pursued at the expense of well-being. 
Indeed, in our book we repeatedly show that divergences between the prescriptions of notions of
fairness and those of welfare-based analysis can be traced to differences between the realm of
everyday life, the appropriate domain of social norms, and that of regulation through the
apparatus of control of the modern state, where we argue that analysis should be based
exclusively on welfare.
11
Thus, if we are self-conscious about the role of social norms and the corresponding
origins of our instincts and intuitions about notions of fairness, we would not be led to attach
independent weight to notions of fairness when assessing policy.
12  This theme, like our other
two principal themes, is developed both in general terms (in this instance drawing on a range of
literatures in the social and natural sciences) and in great detail in chapters III-VI in each of the
legal contexts that we examine and with respect to each of the leading notions of fairness that we
consider.
Our first two themes — involving how giving importance to notions of fairness leads to
needless sacrifices in our well-being, and the lack of affirmative rationale for (and other
difficulties with) notions of fairness — indicate why our normative thesis that policy assessment
should be based exclusively on considerations of individuals’ well-being is correct.  Our third
theme is complementary in that it reconciles our thesis with widely held moral instincts and
intuitions and, relatedly, it shows why contrary moral arguments, substantially grounded in such13Craswell also cites to similar effect Chang (2000a) and an unpublished manuscript by
Barbara Fried, Can We Really Deduce Welfarism from the Pareto Principle (which we have not
read, although we have seen an earlier version).
We do not address here most of the second section of Craswell’s Comment, which
consists of his own version of aspects of some of our arguments regarding our first theme.
14See Chang (2000a, especially III and IV); see also Chang (2000b).
15See, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell (1999, pp. 72-74, including nn. 20, 23); FVW, II.C.1
(including nn. 75-76 & nn.78-80); id., III.C.1.e; Kaplow and Shavell (2000) (replying to Chang). 
We observe that, although Craswell advances an argument very similar to Chang’s and makes
numerous references to Chang’s article, he refers to our reply to Chang only twice, both times
with regard to points he raises in footnotes.  See Craswell (2003, pp. [15 n.17, 20 n.25]).  We
also do not understand why Craswell asserts that in our “initial presentation” of our Pareto
argument, we “do not even address hybrid theories,” but rather “limit [our] initial argument to
fairness theories in which unfairness is given a constant weight, or a weight that is independent
of whether any victims of the alleged unfairness are made worse off.”  Id., p. [12].  To be sure,
we occasionally, for ease of exposition, offered examples with the latter quality, but virtually all
of our analysis, including our particular discussion of mixed views (under which both fairness
and welfare may receive weight), is quite general.  Thus, our first published paper, Kaplow and
Shavell (1999), never makes the posited restriction and specifically addresses hybrid theories. 
See id., p. 72 n.20 (which Craswell himself later quotes, at p. [15]).  Our formal article, Kaplow
and Shavell (2001), explicitly considers any consistent notion of fairness, allowing weight to
vary in any manner as long as it is not discontinuous (which does rule out hybrid theories,
intentionally, on the ground that they are incoherent).  Fairness versus Welfare both defines
fairness in a general manner that includes both hybrid theories and theories under which the
weight given to fairness may vary, even discontinuously, see, e.g., FVW, II.B.1, and explicitly
addresses hybrid theories, see, e.g., id., pp. 53-55 & n.76 (which Craswell also cites later, at p.
[18 n.21]).
- 9 -
instincts and intuitions, should not be seen as posing a real challenge to our thesis.
II.  CONFLICT WITH THE PARETO PRINCIPLE
Richard Craswell (2003) suggests that our argument that pursuing all notions of fairness
sometimes makes everyone worse off might be avoided under certain “hybrid” fairness theories
of the following sort: Apply the initial fairness theory in choosing between two regimes unless
this would make everyone worse off, in which case abandon the fairness theory and instead use a
purely welfare-based assessment, which of course would favor the regime under which everyone
is better off.
13  For reasons given in our original articles on the subject, in Fairness versus
Welfare, and in our reply to Howard Chang who previously advanced a similar view,
14 this
attempt to circumvent our argument fails.
15  The possibility of such hybrid fairness theories does
not, upon reflection, fundamentally challenge our thesis.  Moreover, as moral theories, the hybrid
schemes are incoherent due to what turns out to be their inability to make consistent choices
among alternative regimes and also on account of their discontinuous nature.
Consider first the relationship between the hybrid fairness theories and our thesis.  As we16Craswell suggests otherwise.  For example, he asserts that our argument about conflict
with the Pareto principle “receives most of the emphasis” in our work.  Craswell (2003, p. [1];
see also pp. [2], [41]).  He further states that “we do not make . . . [the substantive problems] the
focus of our critique . . . .”  Id., p. 17 (brackets and words therein in original).  Yet “substantive
problems” are his words, not ours.  As the prominence of II.C.2 and II.D in FVW indicates (as
well as our preface, pp. xviii-xx), we regard all three themes as central; indeed, what Craswell
says we do not emphasize in fact constitutes the substantial majority of our book.
17See, e.g., FVW, pp. 56-57 n.78; Kaplow and  Shavell (2000, p. 244).
- 10 -
explain in section I, the Pareto argument — despite its importance — relates to but one of three
themes in Fairness versus Welfare, and with regard to that theme actually occupies only a part,
often a small part, of our analysis.
16  (As noted in section I.B, for example, in our longest
chapter, on law enforcement and retributive justice, we give extensive attention to how
adherence to retributive justice leads to perverse sacrifices of welfare, while making virtually no
reference to the Pareto argument.)
More directly, our elaboration of the significance of the Pareto conflict, as summarized in
section I.B, makes clear that Craswell’s suggested hybrid theory is largely nonresponsive.  As
we explained there and emphasized in our book, the import of the Pareto conflict has nothing
whatsoever to do with it arising frequently in practice (it does not) or in any particular case under
consideration.  Rather, all of our arguments have to do with the implications of the conflict for
choosing normative criteria.  That most proponents of notions of fairness should find the conflict
with the Pareto principle disturbing Craswell concedes; indeed, this motivates his consideration
of hybrid theories under which fairness is trumped by welfare in those rare cases in which Pareto
conflicts arise.  But if the initial fairness theory is such that it would indeed sometimes deem
making everyone worse off to be socially desirable (morally correct), does this not suggest that
there is something fundamentally wrong with the theory, rather than merely signifying a trivial
blemish to be cured through a bit of fine-tuning?
Furthermore, we emphasize that the cases in which we identify conflicts with the Pareto
principle are simple, basic, paradigmatic, clear cases — ones in which we can be confident of
our normative judgments — in contrast to more complex settings where possibly confounding
factors make normative assessment more difficult, contestable, and prone to error.  Given that
this is so, the idea embedded in Craswell’s hybrid theories, that we should virtually always
follow the questionable guidance derived from more opaque cases while only rarely following
the contrary confident lesson from the clear cases, seems backwards.  As Rawls (1980, p. 546)
has stated, “a theory that fails for the fundamental case is of no use at all.”
Another, related problem is the matter of logical consistency, which has long been a
primary ingredient of moral argument.
17  Craswell’s proposed hybrid schemes would have the
entire basis for normative assessment shift depending on whether a Pareto conflict happens to
arise.  Additionally, as we examine further below, whether or not a Pareto conflict arises can be a
matter of a one cent (indeed, a billionth of a cent) difference in outcome to a single person.  It is
as if Craswell were proposing a moral theory that applied entirely different principles on
Tuesdays, requiring engineers to develop ever-more-precise recording devices for all human18One could argue that this hybrid approach is not a melding of two inconsistent theories
but a single, conditional theory.  That is, one could have a single “apply X except when it is
Tuesday in which case apply not-X” moral theory.  Yet the underlying inconsistency of the
criteria for normative assessment would remain despite calling it one theory rather than an
admixture of two conflicting theories.
19After briefly stating our argument in the symmetric case, he refers to it as a “special
case of rules that affect everyone in society identically.  Most rules, however, do not affect
everyone in society identically . . . .”  Then, he proceeds without further comment to consider
our more general argument outside the symmetric context.  Craswell (2003, pp. [2-3]).
20To elaborate, Craswell’s hybrid theories give no weight to their underlying fairness
principles whenever they would conflict with the Pareto principle, and we demonstrate that such
conflicts always arise when fairness is decisive in a symmetric setting.  Therefore, in symmetric
settings, Craswell’s hybrid theories can never give any weight to fairness.  Accordingly, if
principles for all asymmetric settings are to be derived from what principles should govern in
symmetric ones, it follows that one should never give decisive weight to a notion of fairness in
any asymmetric setting either.
21It is unclear the extent to which Craswell disagrees with us regarding these arguments. 
Often, he merely seems to suggest that various views are plausible and that our particular
position really involves “substantive” arguments.  Craswell (2003, p. [17 & n.19]).  We see the
arguments to follow in the text as going more to whether a hybrid moral theory is coherent or
even can be said to exist in any meaningful sense rather than to what is ordinarily meant by
substantive moral argument between competing theories, but ultimately the question of
categorization is purely semantic.
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activity, linked to atomic clocks, because whether an event occurs a nanosecond before or after
the stroke of midnight could fundamentally alter the how the social response should be
determined.
18
Additionally, our demonstration of the Pareto conflict in all symmetric cases is telling for
hybrid theories.  Craswell dismisses the significance of this demonstration because fully
symmetric cases rarely arise in practice.
19  But, once again, our point was never that Pareto
conflicts or symmetric cases occur frequently; we clearly stated that they do not (as noted in
section I.B).  Instead, we explained that prominent moral frameworks — the Golden Rule,
categorical imperative, veil of ignorance — all require that every moral principle be tested as if
one is in the symmetric case; it is usually a hypothetical case, but one that is ideally suited for
discerning which moral principles are correct.  Hence, for those not ready to discard, indeed
reverse, all of these teachings, every notion of fairness must be rejected.
20
In sum, Craswell’s hybrid theory does not avoid the force of our arguments based on the
conflict between notions of fairness and the Pareto principle.  Independently, we now explain
how the sort of hybrid schemes that Craswell proffers are internally incoherent as moral
theories.
21  With regard to this part of our argument, we observe that Craswell (like Chang) is
really responding not to Fairness versus Welfare, but rather to a short, technical, economics
journal article containing our general demonstration (that is, without regard to symmetric
settings) of the conflict between all notions of fairness and the Pareto principle.  Furthermore,22A third problem is that it is unclear whether Craswell’s hybrid theories, whatever their
other infirmities, even count as nonwelfarist theories.  He refers to our observation in our
technical article, Kaplow and Shavell (2001, p. 283), to the effect that under any nonwelfarist
theory it must sometimes be true that there will exist two regimes that are judged differently
even though every individual’s level of well-being is identical under each regime.  Craswell
states that this description “does not include any hybrid fairness theories.”  Craswell (2003, p.
[13 & n.15]).  In other words, if welfare levels are identical in two regimes and one regime is in
all possible respects grossly unfair compared to the other, under Craswell’s hybrid “fairness”
theories he is implicitly asserting that he requires a judgment of indifference.  However, some
reflection reveals that such a theory really is a purely welfarist theory, as we explain Kaplow and
Shavell (2000, p. 241 n.10).  (Briefly, under a purely welfarist theory, it is sufficient to know
every individual’s welfare level to choose among policies, and Craswell’s statement means that,
for any configuration of individuals’ welfare levels, there corresponds a unique social
assessment that is independent of any nonwelfare factor, notably, any pertaining to a notion of
fairness.)  As we explain in note 24, however, the scheme that Craswell articulates in subsequent
correspondence does not yield coherent choices among possible regimes; since it is thus a non-
theory, it really cannot be classified under our welfarist-nonwelfarist dichotomy, which was only
meant to apply to theories capable of yielding consistent normative choices.
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Craswell (like Chang) offers an informal, not-entirely-specific or consistent counter-example to
our formal analysis and proof (the validity of which is not contested).  For present purposes, we
will focus on our two most pertinent objections that, although technical, are of decisive
importance.
22
First, if any hybrid fairness theory (or any other theory) is even to be considered as a
candidate for an ideal normative criterion for policy assessment, it must be capable in principle
of making consistent choices among possible regimes.  As it turns out, the sorts of hybrid
theories that Craswell offers to circumvent our Pareto argument do not meet this basic
requirement.  In our reply to Chang, we emphasized that none of the informal examples that
Chang had offered us over the course of a year — including Chang’s hybrid theory, which is
essentially the same as Craswell’s — in fact succeeded in providing a logically coherent
construct that both accorded some decisive weight to a notion of fairness and avoided conflict
with the Pareto principle.  Kaplow and Shavell (2000, p. 246 & n. 24).  Craswell’s Comment, in
essence, offers an informal restatement of one of Chang’s unsuccessful examples.
To illustrate the difficulty, suppose that there are three regimes, A, B, and C.  Under a
posited notion of fairness, A is perfectly fair, B is moderately unfair (say five individuals are
treated somewhat unfairly), and C is significantly unfair (an additional ten individuals are treated
quite unfairly).  Under a pure version of the notion of fairness, the regimes would be ranked A
best, B second, and C worst.  But now suppose that the welfare of every individual in regime C is
somewhat greater than it is in regime A (because some other aspect of the regime sufficiently
benefits those treated unfairly in C).  Under the hybrid approach, one is therefore compelled to
hold that regime C is definitely morally superior to A.  The problem, however, is that the same
hybrid theory insists that regime A is definitely morally superior to regime B and that regime B is23We are assuming that there is no Pareto relationship between regimes A and B or
between regimes B and C.  It is obviously easy to construct such cases (simply have equal
distributions in A and C but a somewhat unequal distribution in B such that at least one
individual is better off than in A and C and another individual is worse off than in A and C).
24In private correspondence after we received Craswell’s Comment, we pressed this
point, and he responded by offering a more precisely articulated (and subtly different) version of
the hybrid theory, accompanied by careful analysis that itself demonstrated a similar sort of
intransitivity.  In particular, it had cases in which regime A is definitely morally superior to
regime B, B definitely morally superior to C, but not having A definitely morally superior to C. 
(Specifically, moving from A to C may be immoral, even though it would be commanded to
move from A to B if given that choice, and from B to C if given that choice.)  In addition, this
version had cases in which moving from A to B would be a definite moral improvement, and so
would be moving from A to C, but B and C cannot be morally compared, rendering the theory
conceptually indeterminate.  (More precisely, whichever regime one “moves” to first, B or C,
there one must stay; yet these moves are mere mental exercises, so it is as if whichever regime
first comes to mind is on that account deemed to be the morally best regime.)  For yet another
example of inconsistency generated by Craswell’s hybrid approach, see note 30.
25Craswell (2003, p. [19]) seeks to cast doubt on our objection to discontinuity on the
ground that the objection applies to nearly any theory involving individual rights.  However, that
an otherwise sound argument also applies to other theories is hardly a response to the argument. 
Furthermore, his claim is incorrect, for it has long been true that many philosophers (and even
more so, their fellow travelers) who accept individual rights or other principles would allow
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definitely morally superior to regime C.
23  And if one adheres to basic logic, it follows a fortiori
from these two judgments that regime A is definitely morally superior to regime C.  But a
moment ago we noted that the hybrid theory necessarily deems regime C to be definitely morally
superior to regime A, in order to avoid the Pareto conflict.
This failure of logical consistency — which is almost identical to one of the flaws we
emphasized in our reply to Chang (Kaplow and Shavell 2000, pp. 243-45) and which Craswell
does not address in his Comment
24 — renders Craswell’s hybrid theory a non-theory.  One
cannot determine what it favors even in principle.  Once contradiction in normative analysis is
embraced — something can be both morally superior and morally inferior, all depending on the
order in which one chooses to think about the possibilities — it is really the case that anything
goes.
Second, Craswell acknowledges that his proposed hybrid scheme is discontinuous, in that
it switches assessment criteria in response to small shifts in outcome.  (This acknowledgment, as
Craswell recognizes, is important because our proof shows that if an assessment method is
continuous, it necessarily follows that it conflicts with the Pareto principle if weight is ever
given to fairness, and this is so however much one might attempt to modify the notion of
fairness, as long as there remains even a single case in which fairness receives any weight.) 
Craswell suggests that fairness proponents should not be bothered by such discontinuity, but we
believe that once its meaning is fully grasped, this feature will be recognized to be wholly
unacceptable.
25them to be smoothly traded off in a manner that does not imply any discontinuity, both in cases
of conflicts between competing rights and in cases of conflicts between rights and welfare.  A
prominent example is Ross (1930).  Additionally, it is entirely familiar that the use of knife-edge
distinctions in formulating legal rules (see Craswell 2003, p. [19]) hardly implies that the
underlying principles, viewed from an ideal perspective, have radical discontinuities.  (Consider
setting an age floor for driving or voting.)  And, as we emphasize in our book, see, e.g., FVW,
pp. 66-69, 76-77, similar points hold true for moral intuitions, including Craswell’s, Chang’s, or
a reader’s, that may seem to favor a discontinuous system of rights even though the true, ideal
theory behind it would not.  These ideas, which fully rationalize our intuitions yet lend no
support to taking them as real indicators of the correct normative theory, are aspects of one of the
main themes of our book (see section I.D, above), one not addressed by Craswell.
26The example in the text, following Craswell, uses the weak Pareto principle, which is
decisive only when every individual is strictly better off.  If instead, one required only a single
individual to be strictly better off (and the others merely at least as well off) or if one ignored
fairness if everyone was equally well off, a slightly different illustration could be used to make
the same point.
27Craswell (2003, pp. [9-11]) acknowledges that some fairness theorists would balk at his
first premise, but he suggests that not all would and that they need not.  We are much more
skeptical, which is to say that it seems to us that most who endorse notions of fairness could not
accept this premise.  For example, Craswell (2003, p. [18]) points out that under the required
assumption nothing can ever be viewed as intrinsically evil — or, we would add, intrinsically
wrong, unfair, or unjust.  Craswell is not ruling out only the extreme view that intrinsic evil
trumps all other considerations, including welfare, but also far more modest views that simply
hold that certain acts, rules, or situations are viewed negatively from a normative point of view
independent of the welfare levels of those involved and how these welfare levels may be
influenced by aspects of the regime that have nothing to do with what makes something
intrinsically evil.  See also supra note 22 (suggesting related implications of his first premise that
we suspect most fairness proponents would reject).  Nevertheless, our argument only aims to
show that, for any who do accept the first premise, the second premise is implausible.
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Craswell (2003, pp. [1, 6-7]) asks the reader to accept both of the following two features
of his hybrid scheme:
1. First, if anyone suffering from unfairness under a regime is in some (possibly
unrelated and indirect) manner better off than under another, fair regime, the
former regime’s unfairness receives no weight whatsoever.  Thus, everyone is
treated unfairly under regime A, compared to regime B, and if each person thereby
suffers in an amount that he regards as indifferent to losing $1000, then the
unfairness is entirely ignored if each individual has $1000.00000000001 more
under A than under B.
2. Second, if the compensation instead leaves a single individual merely as well off,
giving him exactly $1000, so no longer is everyone strictly better off under
regime A, then unfairness receives full weight and hence regime B would be
favored.
26
But if one indeed accepts the first feature (as is required under Craswell’s scheme to avoid the
Pareto conflict),
27 it seems ridiculous to accept the second.  Rather, if unfairness dissolves28Craswell’s hybrid theories can be described as ones involving waivers of rights, but this
way of describing the theories does not evade the substance of our argument.  If waiver is
automatic (as under Craswell’s theory) when an individual gains by $1000.00000000001, then
the degree of moral offense from a lack of waiver when the individual instead gains by $1000
can hardly be significant.  Indeed, it can hardly be worth an individual’s — or a policy analyst’s
or government decisionmaker’s — effort even to determine a regime’s effects with such
precision, if such were possible.
We remind the reader that Craswell needs this discontinuity to avoid our proof of the
conflict with the Pareto principle; hence, the obvious “fix” to his hybrid scheme, under which the
degree of unfairness rises as the extent of compensation for the unfairness falls short of full
compensation, is unavailable to him.
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entirely when individuals each receive an additional $1000.00000000001, then surely it
dissolves substantially if one of them merely receives an additional $1000.  Put another way, if
regime A is clearly and nontrivially normatively inferior to regime B if the one individual under
A receives exactly $1000 more than under B, then if he instead receives exactly $1000 for sure
and an additional billionth of a cent as well if lightening strikes 100 consecutive times at a given
point within a predetermined one-second interval, surely no coherent moral theory would reverse
its verdict on account of such a difference.  If individuals’ well-being is decisively important
when the amount individuals each receive is $1000.00000000001, can it really make sense that
consideration of individuals’ well-being is radically less important or wholly unimportant when a
single individual’s receipt is ever so slightly less?
28
We acknowledge that the reader may have some difficulty accepting the last set of points
regarding incoherence and discontinuity.  Why is it that, in order to avoid the Pareto conflict,
Craswell (like Chang) offers modified theories that are so bizarre and incoherent?  Why didn’t
he suggest more plausible variations of notions of fairness instead?  The answer lies in our proof,
which demonstrates that under minimal assumptions of logical coherence and continuity,
avoiding the Pareto conflict while still giving weight to notions of fairness is impossible.  Hence,
those seeking to avoid the proof’s implications (the Pareto conflict) are forced to propose
schemes having such unacceptable properties.
The proof itself appears in our original technical paper (Kaplow and Shavell 2001, p.
284), with a prose version in our reply to Chang (Kaplow and Shavell 2000, pp. 240-41).  One
way to express the intuition underlying it is as follows: As long as a notion of fairness sometimes
receives nontrivial weight, it follows that one would sometimes favor a fair regime over an
unfair regime where the latter has greater welfare (but not by so much as to outweigh whatever
weight was given to fairness).  Now one can also imagine a regime like the latter one — just as
unfair and for the same reason (say, unfair punishment is applied equally often and to the same
extent), but where the overall level of social welfare is distributed the same as it is in the first
regime, implying that the excess welfare relative to the first regime is shared pro rata.  In that
case, the modified second regime is viewed as inferior to the first regime (because the modified
second regime is no better than the original second regime, which itself is inferior to the first
regime according to the notion of fairness).  Nevertheless, this modified second regime has
higher total welfare with the surplus divided evenly, necessarily making everyone better off than29It has been suggested to us that discontinuity is not problematic as long as the absolute
amount sacrificed is not infinite; that is, there is no difficulty per se with the rate of change (in a
sense, the price per unit) being infinite.  But consider a simple example: A person enters a
chocolate shop and asks to buy a pound of elegant truffles.  The shopkeeper responds, “You
misunderstand, sir.  You have only $1000 in your pocket, and the price is a trillion dollars a
pound.”  This suggestion about discontinuity is tantamount to saying, “O.K. then, I’ll take $1000
worth.”  The idea seems to be that this answer cannot be crazy if the customer only pays $1000. 
But if indeed the trillion dollar price is ridiculous, then so is purchasing $1000 worth, which in
this case might amount to a few molecules (we haven’t performed the calculations).  And since
the person literally would purchase at an infinite price, even one imagines that it is possible to
taste such a minute morsel, this would not suffice to rescue the sanity of the approach because
the customer must be willing to buy even if the price were a trillion dollars per electron, and so
on ad infinitum.
30Yet another manner in which a hybrid theory’s discontinuity can generate inconsistency
involves uncertainty.  Suppose, for example, that a reform would otherwise be unfair to a large
group of individuals, that each of them ex ante expects to gain from the reform, but that exactly
one of them will in fact end up being the slightest bit worse off ex post (say, a million people
each have a one in a million chance of being that person).  Craswell’s theory would favor the
reform, viewed ex ante, because the unfairness is deemed to be waived by everyone.  But if the
decisionmaker (or moral analyst) had brief access to a crystal ball that revealed the identity of
the loser, then if he happened to see the loser’s name in the crystal ball an instant before reaching
the mental conclusion in favor of the reform, the reform would have to be scrapped because that
one loser could not be deemed to waive his right not to be subject to unfairness.  This result must
hold even though knowing the name of the person really is morally irrelevant information
because it was already known that precisely one person would end up slightly worse off, and
under the moral theory it is presumably immaterial whether that person, selected essentially
randomly, happens to turn out to be Smith or Jones.
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under the first regime.  To avoid this sort of conflict with the Pareto principle, Craswell (like
Chang) must have the weight given to fairness change dramatically — in fact, at a literally
infinite rate — in response to possibly tiny changes in the level or distribution of welfare.  This
explains why their circumvention schemes need to be discontinuous.
29
In addition, the presence of such a discontinuity helps to understand why attempts to
evade the reach of our proof also tend to display intransitivity (A definitely superior to B, B
definitely superior to C, but A not superior to C).  In essence, discontinuity in the present context
means that qualitatively different evaluative principles are used depending on which
comparisons are being made.  (Under the Craswell/Chang hybrid, fairness ordinarily, but welfare
alone when Pareto conflicts arise.)  But when the criteria used to compare A with B, to compare
B with C, and to compare A with C can and sometimes do differ, it should not be surprising that
inconsistent judgments are possible.
30
In sum, Craswell’s suggestion that a hybrid theory might circumvent our Pareto
argument, though superficially appealing, fails to respond to the thrust of our substantive claims
— such as those about what the Pareto conflict reveals about the initial notion of fairness or31Our thesis does imply, as the text suggests, that distributive theories should address
themselves to individuals’ well-being rather than other measures of individuals’ situations.  See
FVW, pp. 29-30 n.27.
32We observe that we feel unworthy of any applause, for in Fairness versus Welfare all
we did was state the standard normative paradigm of welfare economics, which as widely taught
in graduate schools takes distribution into account (although as we there acknowledge, see FVW,
pp. 5, 28-29 & n.26, this standard view of economists is not widely disseminated in legal
scholarship).
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about the implications of our symmetric case demonstration — and his scheme does not, upon
examination, constitute a logically coherent system of normative assessment.  We are quite
sympathetic to Craswell and others’ intuitive conviction that there must be some way to
circumvent our demonstrations regarding the Pareto principle.  In fact, when writing Fairness
versus Welfare, we had substantially completed our detailed analysis before we realized the
generality of the phenomenon that notions of fairness sometimes make everyone worse off.  Had
we been asked about the matter five years ago, we would have been inclined to agree with
Craswell and others’ suspicion that there must be some way around the claim for at least certain
principles of fairness.  But, after much reflection and subsequent formal analysis, we have been
forced by the power of logic to change our minds.  However counterintuitive at first (and
second) glance, the deep conflict between notions of fairness and the Pareto principle is quite
general, robust, and powerful in its implications for normative analysis.
III.  DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Jeremy Waldron (2003) addresses matters of distributive justice.  As we explain in
section I.A, the welfare economic approach, which we endorse, incorporates general distributive
concerns.  However, because of the nature of our thesis, consideration of distributive justice is
not central in our book.  Our claim, after all, is that policy assessment should be based
exclusively on policies’ effects on individuals’ well-being and thus that no independent weight
should be accorded to notions of fairness that are not concerned exclusively with individuals’
well-being.  Because principles of distributive justice often are (and, when not, can often be
reformulated to be) based exclusively on individuals’ well-being, the merits of our thesis do not
bear very directly on what is the correct general distributive theory.
31  As we state early in
Fairness versus Welfare (and as Waldron quotes), “we argue, in essence, that legal policy
analysis should be guided by reference to some coherent way of aggregating individuals’ well-
being, in contrast to the view that policy analysis should be guided by notions of fairness and
thus, at least in part, without regard to individuals’ well-being.”  (FVW, p. 27, quoted in Waldron
2003, p. [18].)
Waldron, although applauding our acceptance of the importance of incorporating
distributive justice in our normative framework,
32 nevertheless offers three objections to our
treatment of distributive issues.  First, he is bothered by our “idiosyncratic” or “odd” definition
of fairness because it excludes many distributive principles (classifying them instead as33See Waldron (2003, pp. [3], [9], [10]) for use of the quoted terms and id., pp. [4-17], for
the more general claim.  In the course of making this point, Waldron also advances a more
substantive objection, one that we find difficult to understand.  Id., pp. [10-16].  In essence, he
states our thesis or claim — that policy assessment should be based exclusively on well-being —
as a “premise” and finds our conclusion — that nonwelfare-based principles, notions of fairness,
should receive no weight — to be nearly a tautology, whereas we understand our claim as
something that the body of our book was meant to demonstrate rather than as something to be
taken as given.  (As we note in section I.B, part of one of our arguments in support of our first
main theme is a tautology, but that is another matter.)  In this regard, Waldron does not here (or,
to a very substantial extent, elsewhere in his Comment) make reference to our extensive, detailed
development of our three main themes in chapters III-VI.  He also questions the significance of
the Pareto conflict given that actual instances of conflict seem unlikely, id., pp. [13-14], and
wonders what we would say about arguments such as those based on “desert,” id., p. [16]. 
Hopefully, our summary in section I (and, regarding the Pareto point, our further elaboration in
section II) helps to clarify our enterprise in these respects.
34Morever, in the abstract of the earlier law review version (p. 966) of our book, we also
make clear that distributive concerns are not generally included in our critique of notions of
fairness.
35Waldron (2003, pp. [4-5]) also quotes us, FVW, p. 39, to similar effect.
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welfarist, when they are based exclusively on individuals’ well-being).
33  We have some
sympathy for this point but do not regard it as significant for a number of reasons.
Most important, we make our definition clear, both in our introduction, in section II.B.1
(which is devoted entirely to our definition of fairness), and throughout the book.  (We also offer
a formal, mathematical statement of the definition, which should avoid any possibility of
confusion.  See FVW, pp. 39-40 n.52.)  Relatedly, it seems unlikely that those who get past our
title would misinterpret our thesis as a frontal assault on distributive justice, for we emphasize
our contrary view of overall distributive matters in the text early in our introduction, in our
conclusion, and in sections II.A.2 and II.A.3, which are devoted expressly to the subject.
34  We
also consider distributive effects at a number of points throughout the body of the book.  Indeed,
the many quotations and citations in Waldron’s Comment testify if anything to an excess of
concern in our part in communicating our meaning with regard to this issue.
Our definition of notions of fairness was not chosen arbitrarily, but rather for a very
simple reason: “[W]e define notions of fairness as we do — to include all principles that give
weight to factors independent of individuals’ well-being but only such principles — because the
substance of our argument depends precisely on this characteristic.”  FVW, p. 44.
35  Thus, our
definition neatly states the domain of our thesis and of our analysis.  Furthermore, as we note, all
of the leading notions of fairness that we address in the book are covered by this definition.  We
needed a simple term to refer to this crucial demarcation.  Something like “notions of fairness
other than those that are distributive in a purely welfarist manner” seemed far too clumsy (not to
mention how it would have ruined our title), and we were unable to come up with anything better
than “fairness” (which had the advantage over some alternatives in that it has no generally
accepted canonical meaning).36He also expresses the concern that our analysis makes unavailable use of the language
of fairness for addressing distributive questions.  See, e.g., Waldron (2003, p. [22]).  As we
explain in section I.A, however, our argument concerns the proper criteria for policy assessment
and not at all the language in which arguments relating to such criteria are expressed.  Indeed,
following the very quotation that Waldron offers to demonstrate the basis for his concern, we
state: “And, as we elaborate in the next subsection, distribution can play an important role even
under a system of evaluation that is concerned exclusively with individuals’ well-being. 
Moreover, the criticisms of notions of fairness that we offer are not criticisms of the language
that analysts use or of the need to make value judgments in assessing legal policy . . . .”  FVW, p.
28 (emphasis added).
37Waldron’s (2003, p. [23]) complaint about our “indifference,” and some of his other
statements, however, do not seem apt, as amply demonstrated by his extensive quotations from
our book indicating the contrary.
38For a qualification, see note 31.
39See especially sections II.A.2, II.A.3, III.C.2, III.D.2, IV.D.1, VIII.C, and VIII.D.4.b. 
Some other pertinent comments can be located using our index.
40Most obviously, Kaplow and Shavell (1994).  Interested readers can also see our other
papers cited therein as well as a substantial portion of Kaplow’s writing on taxation.
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Second, Waldron (2003, pp. [17-29]) objects to our decision not to take up the substance
of distributive justice in our book, instead having set it aside as a separate matter for inquiry.
36 
Among other things, Waldron (2003, p. [23]) criticizes our “professed agnosticism” and our
reliance on an “appeal to the division of academic labor.”  To a large extent, we plead guilty, but
we fail to understand in what sense this claim amounts to a criticism.
37
Distributive justice is a subject unto itself, the topic of countless books, indeed of many
scholars’ life work.  As it stands, our book is quite long, and in advancing our thesis about
notions of fairness, we are directly challenging central tenets held by a substantial majority of
moral philosophers and legal scholars who have addressed our subject over the past century. 
Many warned us that we were taking on far too much already.  Attempting as well to offer a
comprehensive account of all important aspects of distributive justice in the same enterprise
would have been imprudent.
It is also the case that dividing analysis of nonwelfarist notions of fairness that are not
concerned with global distributive questions and analysis within a welfarist framework of purely
distributive questions makes a good deal of sense as a logical matter since the subjects are
largely separable.
38  In any event, Fairness versus Welfare does offer a number of remarks
concerning distributive matters.
39  And it so happens that we have addressed issues of income
distribution in some of our other work.
40  Finally, one of us (Kaplow) is currently writing a series
of articles and possibly two books on distributive justice and government policy.
Third, Waldron (2003, pp. [30-39]) argues that we fail to appreciate how situational
distributive judgments (that is, those concerned with who should pay or be paid in a given legal
dispute) entailed by the notions of fairness that we address might be provisionally helpful —
pending construction of a full distributive theory — because they may constitute fragments of, or41See, e.g., FVW, pp. 96 n.20, 122 & n.93, 138 n.127.  For example: “We also observe
that some notions of fairness might be viewed as providing proxy tools for identifying
opportunities to improve the distribution of wealth, rather than as independent evaluative
principles potentially opposed to it.  For example, a principle requiring that victims be
compensated might have this feature if victims are typically poorer than injurers.”  Id., p. 122.
42See, e.g., id., p. 122 & n.93.
43Furthermore, as implied by our discussion in FVW, II.A.3, notions of fairness — even if
they were illuminating proxies for aspects of distributive justice — are unlikely to be helpful in
making actual policy choices in legal (and many other) settings because distributive issues are
usually best addressed more directly, through the tax and transfer system.  See also Kaplow and
Shavell (1994).
44We note that, in this section of Waldron’s Comment, he makes no reference to our
general arguments about the defects of these notions of fairness or to our detailed analysis
thereof in chapters III-VI.
45In passing, Kornhauser makes various other claims and characterizations, but we will
confine our attention to his two main conclusions.  We note, however, that many of his
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constraints on, an overall theory of distributive justice within a welfarist framework.  Because
Fairness versus Welfare does not purport to address what distributive theory is most compelling
or how that determination should be made, we also do not see this claim as a criticism of our
work.  Nevertheless, drawing on our analysis, we do offer two observations regarding Waldron’s
argument.
One is that we discuss explicitly the possibility that some fairness principles that we
criticize may nevertheless serve as proxy indicators of overall distributive concerns.  We make
this point especially with regard to notions of fairness in tort law.
41  However, we find that the
notions are a poor proxy.
42  Also, examining a proxy notion is generally not a promising way of
achieving a refined understanding of whatever concept underlies it.
43
Additionally, we suspect that Waldron is overly optimistic about any direct role that
situational notions of fairness could have in constructing components of an overall theory of
distributive justice.  After all, these notions are not welfarist, so if our thesis is accepted (and
Waldron does not challenge it in advancing his claim), it follows that the notions would tend to
push a distributive theory in normatively inappropriate directions.  More broadly, we have
trouble understanding how Waldron thinks that a nonwelfarist principle can serve as a
component of or constraint on a social welfare assessment that is not supposed to give weight to
any factor other than welfare.  Finally, given the many defects that we identify in these fairness
principles (see sections I.B and I.C), one should be rather reluctant to take intuitions related to
such notions (see section I.D) as reliable guides in formulating a sound distributive theory.
44
IV.  PREFERENCES AND WELL-BEING
Lewis Kornhauser (2003) raises some issues involving our broad notion of well-being, in
particular with regard to our including, among all the intangibles that people may value, the
possible tastes individuals might have regarding notions of fairness themselves.
45  He insists thatstatements are incomplete or otherwise misleading with regard to what we actually say in our
book.  For example, Kornhauser (2003, p. [1]) opens his Comment with the statement: “In
‘Fairness versus Welfare,’ Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell reformulate an earlier claim
asserted in the legal literature that judges ought to maximize wealth.”  As is apparent from the
many quotations in Waldron’s Comment (see, e.g., Waldron 2003, p. [25]), this characterization
is inaccurate.  At the outset of our introduction, we emphasize that our thesis is emphatically not
wealth maximization, see FVW, p. 5, and when we discuss the matter directly, we state that
wealth maximization “is not a well-defined concept” and “[m]ore importantly, and more
obviously, . . . wealth would not constitute a measure of social welfare under welfare economics
because wealth is not defined in terms of individuals’ well-being.”  Id., pp. 35-36.  In addition,
Kornhauser’s (2003, pp. [3-7]) summary of our argument is both incomplete and somewhat
inaccurate, as should be clear if one compares it with our summary in section I above or the
summaries in FVW (for example, the introduction and chapter II).  Likewise, he follows this
summary with the statement: “Three of these four claims are controversial.  A large literature in
ethics debates the merits of welfarism.”  Id., p. [7].  It is as if our book reflected no awareness of
such debates whereas in fact the book is entirely devoted to engaging in that debate and, in the
process, cites and discusses in detail literally hundreds of books and articles by philosophers
holding views opposed to ours.  As one last example, his conclusion, id., pp. [31-34], addresses a
different subject from that in the rest of his paper, regarding the relationship between the work of
policy analysts and public officials.  In so doing, he cites only one of our many sections
addressed directly to these matters (ignoring, for example, FVW, V.C.2, VII.B, and VIII.A), and
what he says about that one section (VII.C) does not closely reflect what is actually presented
therein.
46Our discussion below of Kornhauser’s apparent substantial misunderstanding of our
book may provide the explanation.
47See FVW, pp. 23-24 & n.14, 409.  These statements appear, respectively, at the close of
our section on “Individuals’ Well-Being” at the outset of our book and on the first page of our
later section on “Preferences and Individuals’ Well-Being.”  Since these are the two discussions
in our book most pertinent to Kornhauser’s Comment, it is surprising that he ignores this central
point.
48See Craswell (2003, pp. 39-40).
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our approach is a “strategy” (emphasis in original) “comparable to the legal strategy of
confession and avoidance.”  Kornhauser (2003, pp. [5-6]).  Yet this characterization is inapt.  To
begin, we fail to understand what we are confessing to or avoiding.
46  Nor should our definition
be viewed in this manner when it is in fact standard (though often implicit) in economics not to
discriminate among different possible sources of well-being in the assessment of individuals’
welfare.  In addition, as explained in section I.A and as is clear from our book (e.g., FVW, II.A.1,
VIII.B.3, VIII.B.4), we adopt the position that we do because we believe that one should be
neutral regarding individuals’ well-being rather than arbitrarily privilege some aspects over
others.
Moreover, as we emphasize in our book
47 (as others have noticed
48), whether one adopts
our view of individuals’ well-being or some other is largely irrelevant to our enterprise, for
neither our thesis nor the arguments supporting it depend on the definition of well-being that is49See FVW, p. 54 n.75.  (Lest the reader be misled, this is one of our “long” footnotes,
and it is readily located, both because it is in our main, fairly short section that first discusses our
argument about the Pareto conflict, to which Sen’s article pertains, and because it is listed in at
least three places in our index, under Pareto principle, rights, and Sen.)
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chosen.  We suspect that this is apparent from our summary in section I, and nowhere in
Kornhauser’s Comment does he explain otherwise.  Thus, neither of his two main conclusions
really matter for our purposes.  Nevertheless, we now address each in turn.
First, Kornhauser (2003, pp. [11-18]) argues that taking an encompassing view of well-
being, specifically, one that includes any tastes individuals might have for notions of fairness,
“does not obviously resolve conflicts between rights and Pareto optimality” or, as he puts it in
his conclusion, “between morality and efficiency.”  Kornhauser (2003, pp. [18], [31]).  We
would prefer to phrase the point as involving a failure to resolve the conflict between fairness
and welfare.  But how could he imagine that we would think that it would?  If a mere definition,
first stated in the introduction of our book, resolved the basic conflict, why would we have
written what we did?  And why the title Fairness versus Welfare?  As explained, we chose our
definition of well-being for concreteness (as our analysis does not depend on it) and because we
thought it the most compelling, not because we thought that our definition would eliminate the
need to offer substantive arguments in establishing our thesis.
The actual content of this section of Kornhauser’s paper consists of an extended
discussion of an example of Sen’s, featuring a demonstration of the point that, indeed, an
encompassing definition of well-being that includes tastes for fairness (for a certain notion of
rights, in the particular example) does not necessarily dissolve the underlying conflict.  As
stated, we are hardly bothered by this and fail to see the relevance of the entire discussion.  Part
of our problem in making sense of how this section relates to our arguments is that at no point in
it does Kornhauser cite anything in our book.  In particular, he does not mention any of our
points directed to rights, the existence of our chapter V on legal procedure which contains a
specific section (V.C.1) on the subject of tastes regarding procedures (a subject on which
Kornhauser merely speculates as to what we might think), or even of our specific discussion of
the very example of Sen’s that Kornhauser considers.
49
Second, Kornhauser (2003, pp. [18-28]) criticizes us for equating raw preferences (Jill
likes chocolate, I prefer vanilla, and there’s no room for dispute in matters of raw taste) with
judgments (vanilla is more healthful or eating chocolate is morally preferable because it is a
worthy political statement against exploitation of peasants involved in the harvesting of vanilla
beans).  Kornhauser (2003, p. [31]) summarizes his claim by stating that we “conflate[]
judgments that individuals make with their preferences understood as a favorable attitude such as
a desire.”  Throughout the section, he offers characterizations of our views on the matter that
range from admitted speculation to fairly confident assertions, and he explains why he finds our
alleged views incorrect, notably, for failing to appreciate that judgments, unlike raw tastes, may
reflect matters of fact or analysis about which individuals may be mistaken.
Kornhauser’s discussion, however, is disconnected from what we actually say.  Like the50See FVW, VIII.B.1.  In that section, we also note the case in which individuals may be
misinformed about their own preferences.
51First, although we are unsure of Kornhauser’s position in this regard, what he calls
preferences involving judgments do seem to also have an irreducible aspect of raw taste, making
his dichotomous categorization misleading.  This is obvious with his examples involving health
but seems equally applicable to tastes regarding notions of fairness.  Thus, contemplation may
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preceding section of his Comment, it contains not a single reference to our book.  The sections
that he does not mention include VIII.B, entitled “Preferences and Individuals’ Well-Being,”
which includes a subsection 1 on precisely how to address the possibility that individuals’
preferences might be mistaken and a subsection 4 entitled “Tastes for Notions of Fairness.”  By
contrast, in a footnote in an earlier section of his Comment, he does cite a relevant passage,
stating that “Kaplow and Shavell would permit the policy maker to revise the extended
preferences of an individual to accord with the preferences she would have given true beliefs and
sufficient deliberation.”  Kornhauser (2003, p. [10 n.16], emphasis added, citing FVW, pp. 23-
24).  This accurate representation clearly contradicts the characterizations of us that Kornhauser
offers, without citation, in the section itself.
As noted above, our views on this subject are ultimately irrelevant to our thesis and our
main themes and arguments.  Nevertheless, a brief summary of our position might be helpful. 
We do not in fact believe that all tastes, preferences, aspects of individuals’ well-being —
ranging from those concerning material satisfaction to relationships with others, aesthetics, or
fairness — are identical in every possible respect.  Many types differ in ways that are important
for some purposes and yet also have other features in common.  Thus, as Kornhauser’s footnote
statement acknowledges, we do indeed think that a raw taste is different from, say, a belief about
states of the world, and we expressly discuss the potential relevance to legal policy analysis,
noting, for example, that imperfect information may affect the assessment of legal rules related
to safety regulation.
50  More generally, we view all possible tastes as the same in the sense that
what is relevant for normative analysis is what actually matters to individuals, but tastes may
differ, for example, regarding ease of measurement, the likelihood that they may change over
time or in reaction to policy changes, variation across individuals, and the possible importance of
errors in individuals’ assessments.
Regarding tastes involving fairness in particular, we expressly raise the possibility of
mistaken preferences and suggest that analysts should be willing to look behind such
preferences.  See, e.g., FVW, VIII.B.4 (especially pp. 433-34).  To take a concrete example,
suppose that shortly after a heinous crime many individuals, in the heat of the moment, desire
that the suspect be lynched (or rushed to trial without procedural safeguards) out of a sense that
the gross immorality of the act demands, as a matter of justice, an extremely swift response.  It is
obvious that such tastes could involve mistakes of various sorts; indeed, it may even be likely
that the same individuals would, once the tension eases, deeply regret a prior hasty action and
accordingly feel much worse off.  Thus, we would not consider the initial expression of
individuals’ tastes for fairness or justice to be indistinguishable from an ordinary expression of a
preference for chocolate or vanilla.  (For various reasons, we also believe that Kornhauser may
overdraw the distinctions among various types of tastes,
51 but the foregoing should be sufficientaffect one’s tastes, but ultimately, if one does really care about fairness in some manner, there
must exist an underlying basis for the motivation.  Perhaps a person would feel guilty if he
thought he was supporting an unfair institution.  Without such an underlying desire, a view about
fairness would not really constitute a component of well-being rather than an opinion on policy
or ethics.
Second, his analogy between matters of fairness and of health is incomplete in an
important respect.  Suppose that I feel good because I did what I view to be the morally right
thing.  Even if the best analysis by moral theorists reveals that I am mistaken, this does not deny
my feeling, and if I never had explained to me the error of my ways, I would never in fact feel
regret.  But if I mistakenly eat poison, even if I never come to understand what hit me, I will
nonetheless suffer.  One must keep in mind, as we emphasize throughout Fairness versus
Welfare, e.g., pp. 11-12, 21-23, V.C.1, VIII.B.4, that when fairness is viewed as a taste rather
than as an evaluative principle to be given weight in policy assessment, the question of its
importance is entirely an empirical one, concerning what (and how strong) individuals’ tastes
actually are at various points in time and under various conditions, not the normative question of
what their tastes for fairness might (or should) be if only they in fact were more reflective. 
(Compare: Maybe I should like abstract art and in fact would do so if I had the proper training,
but if I have not, being forced to hear a three-hour lecture on an obscure modern artist will in fact
bore me to tears rather than engender feelings of ecstacy.)
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to indicate that our views — as reflected in what we actually wrote — are substantially different
from what Kornhauser imagines them to be and criticizes.)
V.  CONCLUSION
In Fairness versus Welfare, we argue that policy assessment should be based exclusively
on well-being and hence that no weight should be accorded to independent notions of fairness. 
We advance our thesis by developing three themes, both in general and abstract terms and in
detailed analysis in a range of legal policy contexts and with regard to numerous leading notions
of fairness.
Our first theme concerns how pursuing notions of fairness often involves perverse
sacrifices of human welfare, including the possibility that everyone will be made worse off. 
Craswell’s claim that this latter possibility can be circumvented by resorting to hybrid notions of
fairness does not really address most of our argument and in any event is unsuccessful. 
Waldron’s objections regarding distributive justice suggest the need for more work on the
subject but do not call into question any of our analysis.  And Kornhauser’s comments on
preferences and well-being are essentially irrelevant to our arguments in this regard and also
reflect misunderstandings of our views.  Our second important theme, concerning additional
deficiencies in notions of fairness, especially with regard to their lack of rationale, and our third
theme, which reconciles the intuitive appeal of notions of fairness with our claim that they
should receive no independent weight in policy assessment, are not questioned by these
commentators.
Given these commentaries, the presence of other critiques of our work both in print and52Brief, often familiar, and typically emotionally charged hit-and-run counter-examples to
our position (many of which we examined, some in depth, in our book) are, we would argue,
insufficient to raise a serious challenge in light of our arguments and, in many instances, the
serious, thoughtful analyses of many scholars who have preceded us.  (We note that the
commentators in the present symposium do not resort to this common tactic.)
53Furthermore, we suggest that an attack on our overall position would be more plausible
if it concentrates on one of the many leading notions of fairness that we consider in Fairness
versus Welfare.  After all, we take on a variety of fairness principles, and those that we examine
are among the most prominent ones developed over the ages, by the likes of Aristotle and Kant
as well as legions of contemporary moral philosophers (not obscure notions that have received
limited support).  As we believe to have demonstrated, notions that have long seemed persuasive
can be shown to be fundamentally deficient on many grounds if the notions are scrutinized with
sufficient care.
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forthcoming, and perhaps most importantly the almost unshakable belief we all have in our own
instincts and intuitions that seem to support notions of fairness, we find it useful to echo the
conclusion of Fairness versus Welfare by reminding the reader of what seems minimally
necessary, in light of our analysis, for a proposed notion of fairness to be taken seriously.
52
1. The notion of fairness must be stated with some precision and in a manner that is
complete (unlike virtually all the leading notions of fairness that we consider).
2. It must be explained how the notion can make sense given that the consequences
of pursuing it may well run counter to the notion’s underlying motivations.
3. The manner in which the notion reduces individuals’ well-being, including the
possibility of its reducing everyone’s well-being, needs to be clearly identified.
4. An explicit rationale for according weight to the notion must be offered.
5. Contrary explanations for the notion’s seeming appeal have to be ruled out; this is
especially so regarding the possibility (which appears to be realized with respect
to every leading notion of fairness that we examine) that the notion’s appeal may
lie in its correspondence to social norms that themselves are best understood
functionally, as serving to promote individuals’ well-being.
In our book, we developed each of these points in great detail, with tremendous attention to the
views of the many scholars over the ages who advance notions of fairness.  For those who
advocate that analysts should nevertheless be guided by notions of fairness, it would seem
incumbent on them to offer a direct response, addressing each of these points with regard to
whatever notion of fairness is being offered.
53- 26 -
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